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Abstract 
 
In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new 
Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently 
go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from 
the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we 
show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant’s optimum and the 
government’s optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any 
GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-
enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers. 
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Introduction 
A geographical indication (GI) is a collective label, backed by government regulation, to 
certify the geographical origins of a product. A well-known example is the sparkling wine 
Champagne, produced in the Champagne region in France. Since GIs certify the 
geographical origin of a product, the exact geographical delimitation is the fundamental 
characteristic of a GI. For instance, the World Trade Organization requires that a GI 
product possess a “given quality, reputation, or other characteristic” that is “essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin” (WTO 1994; Marette et al. 2008). Likewise, for the 
European Union (EU), a designation of origin certifies a product “whose quality or 
characteristics are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment 
with its inherent natural and human factors” (EU 2012, Art. 5/1).1  
In parallel with the growing importance of GIs in domestic markets and in 
international trade,2 several authors have explored the economics of GIs. Zago and Pick 
(2004), Lence et al. (2007) and Moschini et al. (2008) show welfare gains due to the 
resolution of asymmetric information problems, as a GI label allows consumers to 
                                                 
1 This notion that the geographical origin of a product determines its characteristics is sometimes 
captured by the term “terroir”. 
2 While some countries consider GIs to be a way to solve information problems, others interpret them 
as pure protectionism. These differences of opinion have led to what Josling (2006) described as a “war on 
terroir”. GIs are currently an issue for the ratification of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Trade and 
Economic Agreement (CETA), and they are being debated in the ongoing negotiations on the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. 
The most important multilateral agreement about GIs is the Lisbon System for the International 
Registration of Appellations of Origin, which only has 28 members. “The signatories to the Lisbon Union 
agree to mutual protection of each other’s GIs, so long as they are protected in the home market and included 
in a register kept by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)” (Josling 2006, p. 350). For 
wines, more agreements exist, such as the 2006 Agreement between the US and the European Community 
on Trade in Wine.  
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distinguish high quality products from low quality at the moment of purchase. Mérel and 
Sexton (2012) also find that GIs can increase social welfare, but also can be used to extract 
rents from consumers through the overprovision of quality. Desquilbet & Monier-Dilhan 
(2014) show that binding product quality specifications in a GI may adversely affect 
producers. Menapace & Moschini (2014) model GIs as enabling informative advertising, 
and analyze how the extent of GI protection affects consumer and producer welfare. 
An issue which so far has received limited attention is how the size of a GI is 
determined and how this relates to the socially optimal size. This is an important issue 
since the essence of a GI is its specific “terroir”, i.e. its geographic region of a certain size 
– with the size influencing rent distribution among interest groups and overall welfare. 
The determination of a GI’s size typically involves a role for the government, so taking 
into account political economy considerations appears crucial. 
To our knowledge, only two studies have addressed the question of how the size of a 
GI is determined. Langinier and Babcock (2008) model the choice of GI size as 
determined by club-forming producers. When fixed costs related to the GI are shared by 
producers, there is an optimal size that balances the benefits of expanding the club 
(improved cost-sharing) with the downside (lower prices). Langinier and Babcock (2008) 
do not consider the requirement for a GI to be approved by the government. Landi and 
Stefani (2013) do study the interaction between producers and government, but they do 
not allow for cost-sharing nor for decreases in quality as the GI region expands, features 
which are essential characteristics of GIs. 
In this article, we study the setting of a GI’s size as the outcome of a political process. 
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Our political economy model incorporates four salient facts about GIs. First, a larger GI 
area means more production and a lower price for the GI product. Second, a larger GI area 
means that certain fixed costs (e.g. setting up a control body and marketing the GI) can be 
spread over a larger number of producers (as in Moschini et al. 2008; Langinier and 
Babcock 2008). Third, a larger GI area may have a negative effect on (actual or perceived) 
quality, which affects consumer utility and the equilibrium price. Fourth, the initiative to 
create a GI and to propose a size is typically taken by the producer(s) with the highest 
quality, after which approval is sought from the government (see Tregear et al. 2007 for 
case studies). The applicants want to maximize their surplus, while the government’s 
objective function is a weighted sum of social welfare and the lobby contributions of 
interest groups as in Grossman & Helpman (1994) and Swinnen and Vandemoortele 
(2008; 2011). 
We model the interaction between the applicants and the government as a non-
cooperative bargaining game with alternating offers as in Rubinstein (1982) and Osborne 
& Rubinstein (1990). By solving the bargaining game, we show that GI sizes will be in 
between the applicants’ preferred size and the government’s preferred size. The more 
patient the applicants, and the bigger their lobbying weight, the closer the GI will be to 
the applicants’ optimal size. However, we also show that the politically determined GI 
size is still welfare-enhancing. 
Finally, note that a more general contribution of the paper is that, to our knowledge, 
we are the first to provide an intuitive application and exposition of Rubinstein-bargaining 
with non-linear payoff functions. 
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Our article is organized as follows. First, we provide details on the institutional context 
of how a GI’s size is determined. Then, we set up the economic model and identify the 
applicants’ preferred GI size and the social optimum. Then we present the government’s 
objective function and derive its preferred GI size. Next, we solve the bargaining game 
between the applicants and the government and discuss the results. We conclude by 
offering some suggestions for further research and a policy implication. In the appendix, 
we show that our results are robust to discontinuous changes in quality. 
Institutional context of GI creation in the EU and elsewhere 
Since most GIs hail from the European Union (EU), we first explain the EU regulations. 
In the EU, GIs are governed by regulation 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural 
products and foodstuffs (EU 2012).3 Two main schemes exist: the Protected Designation 
of Origin (PDO) and the Protected Geographical Indication (PGI). The two schemes have 
the same official objectives4 and the same procedures for application, but the requirements 
for a PDO are more strict. For a PDO, there are three requirements: (1) a specific origin – 
a place, region or, in exceptional cases, a country, (2) an exclusive or essential link 
between this geographical origin and quality of the product, and (3) geographical 
confinement of all production steps within the designated origin (EU 2012, Art.5/1). For 
                                                 
3 For wine, specific rules apply as per regulation (EC) 491/2009, and for spirit drinks as per regulation 
(EC) 110/2008. For wines, there are additional rules regarding planting rights (see Deconinck and Swinnen 
2014). 
4 The official objectives of the EU GI-scheme are: “to help producers of products linked to a 
geographical area by (a) securing fair returns for the qualities of their products, (b) ensuring uniform 
protection of the names as an intellectual property right in the territory of the Union, (c) providing clear 
information on the value-adding attributes of the product to consumers” (EU 2012, Art.4). 
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a PGI, only one production step needs to happen within the protected region.5 
The EU procedure consists of three phases: (1) the application for a GI by producers, 
(2) a national opposition and approval procedure, and (3) an EU-wide opposition and 
approval procedure. A schematic overview is provided in Table 1. 
The initiative to establish a GI is taken by producers. Typically the process starts with 
an initial phase of informal exchange and bargaining with the national regulators (see  
Tregear et al. 2007; Landi and Stefani 2013; Teuber 2011). The official application 
procedure starts when producers submit the necessary draft documents to their national 
government (EU 2012, Art. 49/2). 6 The member state (MS) then checks whether the 
application meets the formal conditions. If so, it initiates a “national opposition 
procedure”, during which those opposed to the application can express their objections. If 
there is opposition, the applicant is expected to hold talks with the opposition, potentially 
with government mediation. Yet even if the reconciliation talks fail, the government can 
still decide to grant approval. After approval, the MS publishes its decision and the 
                                                 
5 An example of a PDO is Parmesan cheese (“Parmigiano Reggiano”, IT/PDO/0117/0016), produced 
in a region consisting of parts of the provinces Parma, Reggio Emilia, Bologna, Modena and Mantova. All 
production steps have to take place in the designated area: at least 75% of the feed has to be grown there, 
the cows have to be reared there, and the minimum 12-month maturing must be carried out there. The final 
packaging must also occur within the region. An example of a PGI is Dutch Gouda cheese (“Gouda 
Holland”, NL/PGI/0005/0328). The cheese has to be manufactured somewhere in the Netherlands, and the 
milk has to be sourced at Dutch dairy farms. There are no restrictions on the origin of the feed or on the 
place of packaging.  
6 Formally, the application process requires two documents. The first one is the so-called “single 
document”, which contains “the main points of the product specification”, “a description of the link between 
the product and the geographical environment” (EU 2012, Art.8/1) and the proposed geographical 
delimitation. The EU clarified the requirements for the geographical delimitation in implementing regulation 
EU 668/2014, Art.2: “[…] the geographical area shall be defined in a precise way that presents no 
ambiguities, referring as far as possible to physical or administrative boundaries.” The second document is 
the “product specification”, which contains “a description of the method of obtaining the product and, where 
appropriate, the authentic and unvarying local methods” (EU 2012, Art. 7). 
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corresponding product specification. 
The EU has given some leeway to the member states in specifying the national 
procedure. 7 This has resulted in somewhat different national procedures. But while the 
particulars may vary, the national procedures all follow the official application and 
opposition period and rules for MS decision-making. 
After national approval, the application goes to the EU for final approval. The 
European Commission (EC) checks whether the necessary conditions are met, and if so, 
makes the application documents public and launches an opposition period of three to five 
months. If there is no opposition, the GI is registered. In case there is opposition, and the 
EC judges it admissible, the applying MS has to seek a compromise with the opposition 
in a period of maximum 6 months. If a compromise is reached, the GI is registered. If 
there is no compromise, the EC decides on the issue. 
GI schemes in other countries 
There are two main approaches to GIs (Giovannucci et al. 2009; Josling 2006). Most 
countries (111 countries including the EU MSs) use a specific or so-called “sui generis” 
system for GIs. In 55 other countries (including the US), GIs are covered by a generic 
trademark or certification system. This means that GIs can be requested by any individual 
                                                 
7 As an example, In France, a request to create or change a GI area needs to be submitted at the Institut 
National d’Appellations d’Origine (INAO). If the INAO deems the application admissible, it will appoint a 
committee to study the request. In addition, it will nominate consultants to study the proposed geographical 
area. The consultants formulate “delimitation principles”, on the basis of which an expert panel, working 
together with the applicant, will eventually propose a delimitation of the GI area, which is then subject to a 
two-month opposition procedure. After the opposition procedure, during which the applicants have to 
respond to any legitimate opposition, the INAO will have a final vote on the application. In case the 
application is approved, the Ministry of Agriculture will make the decision official. (INAO 2011) 
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producer, and that there is no need for a proof of a causal link between geographical origin 
and product quality. 
Even within countries that take the generic trademark approach, there may be specific 
systems for some sectors. One example is the US scheme of American Viticultural Areas 
(AVAs).8 Producers file a petition for an AVA label at the US Alcohol and Tobacco Tax 
and Trade Bureau (TTB). The TTB checks the petition and publishes a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) to solicit public comments (CFR 2014, §9.14). The TTB then 
reviews potential comments and prepares a final rule for publication, with or without 
changes. The procedure is hence similar to the EU procedure for requesting GIs, except 
for the fact that the TTB can impose a size without approval from the initiating producers. 
Implications for the model 
It is clear from the description of the institutional context that all GI procedures involve 
an initiative from the producers and a process of bargaining with the government. In our 
model we capture these two features. To keep the model tractable, we assume a single 
regulatory authority called “the government”. 
The economic model 
Consider a region with a continuum of producers indexed by their distance 𝑖 from the 
                                                 
8 An AVA is a “grape-growing region having distinguishing features as described in part 9 of the TTB 
regulations, in Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, (27 CFR part 9) and a name and a delineated 
boundary as established in part 9 of the TTB regulations. The use of an AVA name on a label allows vintners 
and consumers to attribute a given quality, reputation, or other characteristic of a wine made from grapes 
grown in a certain area to its geographical origin. Thus, the establishment of AVAs allows vintners to 
describe more accurately the origin of their wines to consumers, and, in turn, helps consumers to 
geographically identify wines that they may purchase” (AVA manual for petitioners). A well-known AVA 
is the one in Napa Valley, California. 
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center of the region. All producers in the region produce one unit of the same type of 
product (e.g. a specific type of cheese) but vary in the quality of their production. Their 
product quality is 𝜎(𝑖) > 0 which is weakly decreasing as we move away from the center: 
𝜎𝑖 ≡ 𝜕𝜎 𝜕𝑖⁄ ≤ 0.
9  
We assume that both the location and the corresponding quality of a producer are 
determined exogenously.10 The simplifying assumption that the quality of a product 
depends only on its geographical origin can be defended on two grounds. First, objective 
aspects of the region (such as the soil, the micro-climate and local traditions) may 
influence the actual quality of the product. Second, even if there was no real link between 
terroir and objectively verifiable quality, consumers might attach intrinsic value to a 
product’s origin.11 
An assumption that is sometimes made in the literature is that entry is free so that 
producers are perfectly competitive inside the GI region (e.g. Mérel and Sexton 2012; 
Moschini et al. 2008), which implies that producer rents will be competed away. In our 
model, entry is restricted in the sense that production is constrained by the available land 
within the GI region. Once the GI size is set, quantity thus becomes exogenous. The 
                                                 
9 Throughout, subscripts denote partial derivatives to simplify notation. We assume a continuous quality 
function in the main text for expositional convenience, and show in the appendix that the results with 
discontinuous quality are similar. 
10 As in Zago and Pick (2004), we abstract from the possibility that producers themselves can make a 
choice over the level of quality to be attained. For frameworks with an endogenous discrete choice between 
high and low quality, see Langinier and Babcock (2008) and Moschini et al. (2008). For continuous 
endogenous quality, see Mérel and Sexton (2012). 
11 A similar assumption is made by Desquilbet and Monier-Dilhan (2014), who assume that the PDO 
label has a positive image, which confers some ‘status’ characteristic  on the product. In an empirical paper 
on the protection of German apple wine from Hesse, Teuber (2011) concludes that for local consumers, 
psychological factors such as supporting an authentic product and supporting the local economy are key, 
while for distant consumers the quality aspect of a GI label is more important (Teuber 2011). 
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appropriateness of this assumption depends on the specific GI at hand; it seems most 
appropriate to study GIs such as Champagne, with small areas and high utilization rates.  
Given these assumptions, producers can only affect their profits by influencing 
consumers’ quality perception through the use of a GI. Without a GI, consumers are 
unable to distinguish products from different producers. A GI allows them to distinguish 
between products from the GI region and those from outside. Consistent with the seminal 
work of Moschini et al. (2008) we assume that without a GI, products are essentially 
undifferentiated commodities with zero profits and that the price of this non-GI good is 
unaffected by the introduction of the GI. We normalize its price to 1. 
We assume that the initiative to apply for a GI is taken by the producer who has the 
highest quality and who is hence losing the most from consumers’ lack of information. 
We call this producer “A”, the applicant producer.12 He proposes a size for the GI region 
to the government. If the government approves A’s proposal, a GI region is established 
with a certain size 𝑥. Given our assumptions, 𝑥 also equals the number of producers in the 
GI as well as total GI production. We define insiders 𝐼 as the group of producers with 𝑖 ≤
𝑥, and outsiders 𝑂 as producers with 𝑖 > 𝑥. The average quality of the insiders and thus 
of the GI is 𝑠(𝑥) ≡ 𝜎(𝑥) =
1
𝑥
∫ 𝜎(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
𝑥
0
. Since quality 𝜎(𝑖) is weakly decreasing in 𝑖, the 
same is true for average quality as a function of 𝑥: 𝑠𝑥 ≤ 0. 
Following Moschini et al. (2008) and Langinier and Babcock (2008), we assume that 
managing a GI region implies costs of 𝐹 + 𝑐𝑥 where 𝐹 represents fixed costs (e.g. 
                                                 
12 Given our assumptions on quality, producer A is the producer located at the origin. We use the term 
“producer A” for expositional purposes; our model is fully continuous.  
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marketing expenses) and 𝑐 denotes variable costs such as production and certification 
costs. The GI costs are shared by the GI producers: they pay a per-unit charge of 𝑐 +
𝐹
𝑥
. 
Producer surplus for an insider 𝑖 is then given by Π𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
, with 𝑝 the price of 
the GI good.13 The total surplus of insiders is Π𝐼(𝑥) = ∫ Π𝑖(𝑥)𝑑𝑖
𝑥
0
= (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑥 − 𝐹. For 
other producers, producer surplus is 0. 
Consumers 
Since at the time of purchase consumers cannot distinguish individual producers within a 
GI, they judge a GI product by the average quality 𝑠(𝑥) of producers in the GI region.14 
The utility from consuming the GI good is given by a utility function 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠) where utility 
is concave in both quantity 𝑥 and quality 𝑠, and a higher quality level increases the 
marginal utility of consumption (𝑢𝑥 > 0, 𝑢𝑥𝑥 < 0, 𝑢𝑠 > 0, 𝑢𝑠𝑠 < 0, 𝑢𝑥𝑠 > 0).15 One 
example of a functional form that meets these assumptions is the Mussa-Rosen demand 
specification.16  
                                                 
13 In our model, all scarce factors, including land and accumulated production knowledge, are owned 
by producers and so all profits and rents accrue to them. 
14 This assumption corresponds to a risk-neutral attitude about quality, simplifying the analysis. If 
consumers were risk-averse, they would judge the GI product by a quality lower than the average. In any 
case, 𝑠(𝑥) is decreasing in 𝑥. 
15 Alternatively, we could work directly with an inverse demand curve as in Spence (1975). Working 
with the utility function makes the notation easier, however. 
16 Moschini et al. (2008) and Mérel and Sexton (2012) use the Mussa and Rosen (1978) demand 
specification in analyzing GIs. We use a more general demand function, so all of our results hold for a 
Mussa-Rosen specification as well (see Swinnen et al. 2015, Ch.2 for a review of different approaches to 
modeling quality). With Mussa-Rosen demand, a continuum of consumers with different taste parameters 
𝜃~𝑈[0,1] obtain utility 𝜃𝑠 − 𝑝 from consuming one unit of the good (with quality 𝑠 and price 𝑝). They buy 
at most one unit, which implies that consumer utility is 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠) = 𝑠𝑥 − 𝑠𝑥2/2. 
 
12 
Consumers maximize their utility by allocating their budget 𝐵 between the GI 
good 𝑥 and the non-GI numeraire good 𝑛. With quasi-linear utility, 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑠, 𝑛) = 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠) +
𝑛 and consumers choose 𝑥 and 𝑛 to maximize 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑠, 𝑛), subject to 𝑝 ∗ 𝑥 + 𝑛 ≤ 𝐵. It  is 
easy to show that consumers behave as if they are maximizing consumer surplus Π𝐶 =
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠) − 𝑝𝑥. This yields an inverse demand function for the GI good of the form 
 
𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑠) = 𝑢𝑥(𝑥, 𝑠) (1) 
The quality-specific demand curve 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑠) is downward sloping in 𝑥 (𝑝𝑥 = 𝑢𝑥𝑥 < 0) and 
shifts upward if quality increases: 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑢𝑥𝑠 > 0. 
The applicant’s optimal size 𝑥𝐴 
Producer A’s profit as a function of the GI’s size 𝑥 is given by Π𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
. His 
optimal size 𝑥𝐴 is defined by the first order condition 
 𝐹
𝑥
= −(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥)𝑥 (2) 
The left hand side of this equality is the benefit from cost-sharing. A larger GI area 
means lower per-unit fixed costs. The right hand side is the price effect: a larger GI area 
means lower prices, resulting both from a larger quantity (𝑝𝑥) and a lower perceived 
quality (𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) as a result of the expanded GI area. At the applicant’s optimum 𝑥
𝐴, the 
marginal benefit from cost sharing is equal to the marginal loss from price erosion. In 
Figure 1, this is achieved at point 𝐸𝐴 with 
𝐹
𝑥
 decreasing with 𝑥 and −(𝑝𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥)𝑥 
increasing with 𝑥. 
The optimal size for aggregate producers 𝑥𝑃 
13 
Producer surplus for all producers combined is Π𝑃(𝑥) = Π𝐼(𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑥 − 𝐹. The optimal 
size 𝑥𝑃 is defined by: 
 
𝑝 − 𝑐 = −(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥)𝑥 (3) 
The right hand side of equations (2) and (3) are the same: this captures the price effect 
from a larger area. The left hand side is different, however. For the applicant (equation 2) 
the term captures the benefit from a larger area which comes from the reduction in the 
applicant’s share of the fixed costs with a larger GI.  However, for all producers combined 
the cost sharing effect is an internal transfer, not a gain.  For aggregate producer surplus  
(equation 3) the left hand side term captures the marginal profit increase (𝑝 − 𝑐) from 
extending the GI to a larger area. The surplus will increase as long as the marginal profit 
is larger than the price decline (the right hand term).  
Note that 𝑥𝐴 will always be smaller than 𝑥𝑃 for any GI that is proposed by an 
applicant.17 We call this difference between 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝑃 the “club-effect”, represented by 
arrow A in Figure 1. 
So far, we have not allowed side-payments for inclusion in the GI.18 If outsiders can 
make side-payments to the applicant this would of course change the applicant’s optimal 
choice.  At the margin, producers outside the GI area would be willing to pay up to their 
                                                 
17 Both  
𝐹
𝑥
 and 𝑝 − 𝑐 are decreasing in 𝑥 while −(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥)𝑥 is increasing in 𝑥. 
𝐹
𝑥
 and 𝑝 − 𝑐 intersect 
with −(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥)𝑥, at 𝑥
𝐴 and 𝑥𝑃  respectively. If 𝑥𝐴 > 𝑥𝑃, this would mean that 
𝐹
𝑥
> (𝑝 − 𝑐) for both 𝑥𝑃 
and 𝑥𝐴. Since producers would not be able to cover their fixed costs, they will not apply for a GI area in 
such a case. So for any GI application, it must be the case that 𝑥𝐴 < 𝑥𝑃. 
18 In fact, the cost-sharing arrangement can be seen as a convenient mechanism to organize side-
payments (although with a limit at 𝐹). So it is more correct to say that we have not allowed for unlimited 
side-payments (on top of the cost-sharing agreement). 
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increased profits from joining the GI area, which is −𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
 .  If these payments would be 
equally distributed among the insiders, the applicant would receive a share 
𝑝−𝑐
𝑥
−
𝐹
𝑥2
, and 
his first order condition would become 
𝜕Π𝐴
𝜕𝑥
= (𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) +
(𝑝−𝑐)
𝑥
= 0. This is equivalent 
to the first order condition for maximum aggregate producer welfare.  Hence, with side-
payments 𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝑃. The result is intuitive: if potential entrants make full side-payments, 
the applicant internalizes the positive effect of increased revenues for these entrants (an 
application of the Coase theorem). The outcome would be similar if we modeled the GI 
application as a cooperative game among producers.   
For the rest of the paper we assume that side-payments are not possible, but as we 
explained here, it is rather straightforward to adjust the analysis if we would allow for 
them.  
The social optimum 𝑥∗ 
The social optimum 𝑥∗ maximizes social welfare 𝑊(𝑥) = Π𝑃(𝑥) + Π𝐶(𝑥) = 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠) −
𝑐𝑥 − 𝐹, and (using 𝑢𝑥 = 𝑝) is defined by: 
 
𝑝 − 𝑐 = −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 (4) 
The left hand side of this equation corresponds to the marginal aggregate producer 
profit, while the right hand side reflects the loss in consumer utility due to the expansion-
related quality decrease. At the social optimum, these marginal effects need to be equal. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the social optimum 𝑥∗ compares to 𝑥𝐴. Three effects play a 
role. The first is the club effect, discussed earlier, which causes the difference between the 
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applicant’s optimum 𝑥𝐴 and the aggregate producer optimum 𝑥𝑃. The difference between 
the producer optimum 𝑥𝑃 and the social optimum 𝑥∗ is caused by two sub-effects. The 
first effect (which one could refer to as “rent-seeking through quantity”) is because 
producers want to restrict their output to increase prices. This effect is represented by 
arrow B in Figure 1 and is determined by 𝐸𝑄 where 𝑝 − 𝑐 = −𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥.  The second  sub-
effect (which one could refer to as “rent-seeking through quality”)  is represented by arrow 
C in Figure 1. A change in quality only affects producers through the price effect 𝑝𝑠. While 
prices are determined ‘at the margin’, from the point of view of consumer surplus all infra-
marginal consumers are affected by a change in quality. The direction of this effect is 
ambiguous.  It depends on the relative impact on the marginal consumer and on the infra-
marginal consumers.  In Figure 1 the effect (C) is depicted as it reinforces the other two 
effects (A and B).  However, this need not always be the case.19 If a larger GI area would 
strongly reduce the willingness to pay of infra-marginal consumers while having a limited 
impact on the marginal consumer, it is possible that producers would desire a larger area 
than the social optimum. 20 
The most intuitive case is 𝑥𝐴 < 𝑥∗: the applicant wants a smaller GI than socially 
optimal. This case holds as long as the club effect and the effect of rent-seeking through 
                                                 
19 Algebraically, rent-seeking through quality counteracts the effects A and B if −𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 < −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥  or 
𝑢𝑥𝑠𝑥 < 𝑢𝑠 and 𝑠𝑥 < 0. This corresponds to a counterclockwise rotation of demand for decreasing quality, 
which requires a decreasing sensitivity to quality or 𝑝𝑠𝑥 = 𝑢𝑥𝑠𝑥 < 0. Note that if this effect is strong, there 
is scope for additional differentiation through private brands or tiered GIs. A real-world example may be 
the recently announced break-up of the French Beaujolais region, where the high-quality “cru”-producers 
are planning a break-out since December 2014 (Verchère 2014). Among other reasons, the lack of a quality 
image attached to the name “Beaujolais” is cited.  
20 This would require the effect C to be in the opposite direction as A and B (as in the previous footnote), 
and for its absolute value to be larger than the effects A and B combined.  
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quantity are not offset by the potentially opposing effect of rent-seeking through quality. 
This case is illustrated in Figure 1, and we will focus on this case in the remainder of the 
paper.  
The political game 
As discussed earlier, a peculiar aspect of GIs is the fact that producers need to apply for a 
GI (submit a proposal) and require government approval. We therefore model the 
determination of the GI size as the outcome of a bargaining game between the applicant 
(A) and the government (G). We first analyze the government’s objective function, and 
then study the political equilibrium resulting from such bargaining. 
The government’s objective function and optimum 𝑥𝐺  
We assume that the government maximizes a Grossman-Helpman (GH) (1994) type 
political objective function, consisting of a weighted sum of interest group lobby 
contributions and social welfare, similar to Swinnen & Vandemoortele (2008, 2011) who 
applied the GH model to analyze government decision-making on food and trade 
standards.  There are three interest groups: insiders (the group of producers with 𝑖 ≤ 𝑥), 
outsiders (the producers with  𝑖 > 𝑥) and consumers. We assume that all interest groups 
producers and consumers are politically organized and that they lobby simultaneously.   
The government’s objective function Π𝐺(𝑥) is a weighted sum of the lobby 
contributions of insiders 𝐶𝐼 (weighted by 𝑤𝐼), of outsiders 𝐶𝑂 (weighted by 𝑤𝑂), the 
contributions of consumers (weighted by 𝑤𝐶), and social welfare, where 𝑤𝐼, 𝑤𝑂 and 𝑤𝐶 
represent the relative lobbying strengths: 
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𝛱𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑤𝐼𝐶𝐼(𝑥) + 𝑤𝑂𝐶𝑂(𝑥) + 𝑤𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑥) + 𝑊(𝑥) (5) 
The optimal GI size for the government, 𝑥𝐺 , is the level of 𝑥 which maximizes its 
objective function.  Each GI size corresponds to a certain level of surplus for specific 
producers (whether they are insiders or outsiders) and consumer surplus, and hence also 
to a certain level of interest group lobby contributions. The government receives higher 
contributions from an interest group if (a change in) the GI size creates more surplus for 
them. Conversely, the government receives less lobby contributions from an interest group 
if (a change in) the size of the GI decreases their surplus. As shown by Grossman-Helpman 
(1994) and Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011) this induces governments to choose the 
size of the GI that maximizes the following weighted sum of interest group surpluses : 
(1 + 𝑤𝐼(𝑥)) Π𝐼(𝑥) + (1 + 𝑤𝑂(𝑥)) Π𝑂(𝑥) + (1 + 𝑤𝐶) Π𝐶(𝑥). 21          
A crucial difference between our model of decision-making on GIs and that of other 
applications of GH models is that the lobby strengths could be endogenous to the choice 
of the GI’s size because the size of the GI determines the size of the insider and outsider 
groups. The optimal standard for the government, 𝑥𝐺 , is therefore determined by the 
following first-order condition: 
 
(1 + 𝑤𝐼)
𝜕𝛱𝐼
𝜕𝑥
+ (1 + 𝑤𝑂)
𝜕𝛱𝑂
𝜕𝑥
+ (1 + 𝑤𝐶)
𝜕𝛱𝐶
𝜕𝑥
+ 𝛱𝐼
𝜕𝑤𝐼
𝜕𝑥
+ 𝛱𝑂
𝜕𝑤𝑂
𝜕𝑥
= 0 (6) 
The last two terms of the optimality condition capture the possible impact of the GI’s 
size on the lobby strengths of the insider and outsider group. An increase in the size of the 
group may reinforce its impact. However, Olson’s (1965) collective action predicts that 
                                                 
21 See also Swinnen et al (2015) for more details and formal derivations.  
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larger groups become less effective at lobbying because of increased free rider problems.  
One can only speculate on the size of these different effects. If there is no impact, or if 
these opposing effects offset each other, the last two terms each drop out of the equation.   
It is easy to show (and intuitive) that the government’s optimal size will be in between 
𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥∗. In the specific case when all interest group have the same lobby weight 𝑤𝐼 =
𝑤𝑂 = 𝑤𝐶, the government’s optimum is equal to the social optimum 𝑥∗. It is obvious that 
if some of the interest groups have stronger lobby weights, their influence on the 
government is stronger and the government’s optimum will be closer to that interest 
group’s optimal size.    
Bargaining over GI size in a Rubinstein-setup 
We now determine the political equilibrium 𝑥𝑒 as the outcome of a political game 
between A and G. The structure of the game is depicted in Figure 2. First, the applicant 
proposes a GI of a certain size (step 1). The government then decides whether to accept 
or reject the proposal (step 2). If it accepts, both parties receive the corresponding payoffs. 
If the government rejects the proposal, it gets to make a counterproposal (step 3).22 The 
applicant then decides whether to accept or reject the government’s counterproposal (step 
4). If A rejects it, he can make another counterproposal (step 5). The government can 
again accept or reject (step 6), and so on until both players agree on the GI’s size.  
                                                 
22 For instance, in the case of the cherry of Lari, presented by Tregear (2007), the idea of a GI originated 
with some small producers. The government quickly tried to convince them to apply for a larger area. In the 
end, the small producers decided not to apply for a GI because of “… fears that the production area would 
be widened too much under the designation, due to political pressure from public institutions […]” (Tregear 
2007, p. 17). 
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Given this setup, and assuming there is complete and perfect information between 
producers and the government, the application procedure can be modeled as a game of 
infinite horizon bargaining with alternating offers (Rubinstein 1982).23 As in Fishburn and 
Rubinstein (1982), we assume that delay is costly for both A and G, as each prefers to 
receive the benefits from a GI sooner rather than later. The applicant A has optimal GI 
size 𝑥𝐴 and discount factor 𝛿𝐴. The government G has optimal size 𝑥𝐺  and discount factor 
𝛿𝐺. For the exposition we consider the case that 𝑥𝐴 < 𝑥𝐺 ≤ 𝑥∗, as illustrated in Figure 
1.24  
Given that the optimal sizes are the maxima of players’ objective functions, a move 
away from their respective optima reduces their payoffs.25 Moving outside of the interval 
between the two optima makes both players worse off, so the bargaining interval is 
[𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐺]. The situation is depicted in Figure 3.26 A understands that, if he deviates too 
much from 𝑥𝐺 , G will prefer to “punish” him by making a counterproposal and postponing 
the payoffs. In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, i.e. with perfect information, both 
players are aware of each other’s incentives and can foresee future strategies. Therefore, 
                                                 
23 In the EU procedure, such infinite-horizon lobbying and bargaining could occur during the informal 
exchanges before the official application is submitted. In conversations with staff at the French regulator 
INAO, several cases lasting over 10 years were mentioned. Assuming a finite bargaining horizon is hence 
not institutionally justified: informal exchanges imply that the actual application process may start long 
before the official procedure is started. Moreover, the implications of a finite horizon model are unrealistic, 
as this would imply that the applicant can make an ultimatum and hence always successfully propose his 
optimal GI size.  
24 The opposite case, 𝑥𝐴 > 𝑥𝐺, can be analyzed in an identical way. If 𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝐺, bargaining is 
degenerate and both players obtain their optimal size. 
25 It is easy to show from our economic assumptions that the applicants’ payoff function is concave and 
single-peaked. Government’s objective function is a positive linear combination of concave functions and 
is hence also concave. 
26 The graphs in this figure have been obtained by assuming Mussa-Rosen demand, and exponentially 
decreasing average quality. 
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agreement is reached immediately (Osborne & Rubinstein 1990, Theorem 3.4), and the 
applicant successfully proposes the equilibrium size 𝑥𝑒 in step 1.  
To derive the equilibrium outcome, we follow the approach of Sutton (1986). 
However, our analysis is complicated by the fact that the payoff functions are not linear, 
as in most applications in the literature. With non-linear payoffs, extra technicalities are 
required for the derivation. We have made the derivation as simple and specific to our 
context as possible. Readers interested in a more general and formal derivation should 
consult Osborne & Rubinstein (1990, Ch.3).  
The equilibrium of the game, as illustrated in Figure 3 is 𝑥𝑒 with a payoff of 𝑍 =
Π𝐴(𝑥𝑒) for the applicant. To understand why, consider the situation at step 5 (where A 
can make the second round proposal). Define 𝑓 as the function that maps A’s payoff to 
G’s payoff.27 At step 5, the payoff to A of the subgame that starts there equals 𝑍; the 
payoff to G is 𝑓(𝑍) = Π𝐺(𝑥𝑒). At step 4, if A refuses G’s offer, he gets a payoff of 𝑍 with 
a delay of one period, which is worth 𝛿𝐴𝑍 to him. As a result, at step 3, G knows that if 
he would offer 𝛿𝐴𝑍 to A, A would accept.28 For G, this offer to A corresponds to a payoff 
of 𝑓(𝛿𝐴𝑍) for himself. At step 2, G realizes that the value of refusing is 𝛿𝐺𝑓(𝛿𝐴𝑍). At 
step 1, A therefore knows that G will only accept an offer of 𝛿𝐺𝑓(𝛿𝐴𝑍) or more.29 This 
in turn corresponds to a payoff  of 𝑓−1(𝛿𝐺𝑓(𝛿𝐴𝑍)) for A. 
Denoting the value to A at step 5 by 𝑍, we have shown by backward induction that the 
                                                 
27 In the simple Rubinstein case, a dollar is being split between two players so this function is given by 
𝑓(𝜋) = 1 − 𝜋. In our case, 𝑓(𝜋) = Π𝐺([Π𝐴]−1(𝜋)). Because both payoff functions are monotonous over 
the bargaining interval, the function 𝑓 from one payoff to another is well-defined and invertible. 
28 If 𝛿𝐴𝑍 < Π𝐴(𝑥𝐺), the government proposes its optimum Π𝐴(𝑥𝐺) instead. 
29 If 𝛿𝐺𝑓(𝛿𝐴𝑍) < Π𝐺(𝑥𝐴), the applicant proposes its optimum Π𝐺(𝑥𝐴) instead. 
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value to A at step 1 is 𝑓−1(𝛿𝐺𝑓(𝛿𝐴𝑍)). Given the infinite horizon of the game, the game 
starting at step 5 is strategically equivalent to the game starting at step 1. This means that 
the value at step 1 must be the same as at step 5, or 
 
𝛱𝐴(𝑥𝑒) = 𝑍 = 𝑓−1(𝛿𝐺𝑓(𝛿𝐴𝑍)) = 𝑔(𝑍) (6) 
This expression defines the political equilibrium 𝑥𝑒 for interior solutions.30 The 
applicant will propose the equilibrium size 𝑥𝑒 in step 1 and the government will accept it, 
so that 𝑍 = Π𝐴(𝑥𝑒) and 𝑓(𝑍) = Π𝐺(𝑥𝑒).  
Since the payoff functions are non-linear, we cannot derive a closed-form solution for 
𝑍.31 However, we can draw some conclusions on how various factors affect the 
equilibrium. In Figure 4, we plot the equilibrium GI size 𝑥𝑒 as a function of 𝛿 𝐴 for three 
different values of 𝛿𝐺. The more patient the government is (the higher 𝛿𝐺), the closer the 
equilibrium outcome will be to its optimal value 𝑥𝐺 .  If the government is impatient (e.g. 
because it wants to implement the GI before its term in office ends, and the term draws to 
an end), it is more likely to yield to the applicant’s wishes. If 𝛿𝐺 = 0, the applicant obtains 
his optimal size. Similar conclusions hold regarding the patience of the applicant.  
Figure 5 illustrates how the lobby strengths influence the equilibrium GI choice.  
When the insiders are more effective at lobbying the government (a relatively higher 𝑤𝐼), 
                                                 
30 Allowing for non-interior solutions (cf. the previous two footnotes), the expression becomes 𝑍 =
𝑔(𝑍) = 𝑓−1[𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝛿𝐺𝑓(𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝛿𝐴𝑍; Π𝐴(𝑥𝐺)}); Π𝐺(𝑥𝐴)}]. Note that the solution 𝑍 is a fixed point of the 
function 𝑔. Since 𝑓 and 𝑓−1 are continuous, the composite function 𝑔 is also continuous. Since 𝑔 is 
continuous, and maps from [Π𝐴(𝑥𝐺), Π𝐴(𝑥𝐴)] back to [Π𝐴(𝑥𝐺), Π𝐴(𝑥𝐴)], it must have a fixed point by 
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, and a solution is guaranteed. 
31 In the simple Rubinstein case, 𝑓(𝑝) = 1 − 𝑝, 𝑓−1(𝑓(𝑝)) = 1 − 𝑓(𝑝) = 𝑝 and we readily obtain from 
(6) that 𝑀 = 1 − 𝛿2(1 − 𝛿1𝑀), so that 𝑀 = (1 − 𝛿2)/(1 − 𝛿1𝛿2). 
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the government’s optimum 𝑥𝐺  shifts towards 𝑥𝐴, and the bargaining interval shrinks, 
resulting in an equilibrium choice which is closer to the applicant’s optimum.   
Discussion 
Our analysis has several implications. Given our assumptions, (1) the GI chosen in the 
bargaining process between applicants and the government is unlikely to be the social 
optimum; (2) however, the GI chosen will still be welfare improving; (3) not all welfare 
improving GIs will be proposed (and thus not implemented); and (4) the outcome depends 
importantly on the institutional set-up of the decision-making process.  
First, as is obvious from comparing the condition for the social optimum and the 
condition for the equilibrium bargaining outcome, it is unlikely that these two conditions 
would yield the same outcome.  
Second, given our assumptions, the GI chosen will still improve welfare because the 
applicant will only start the bargaining process if he expects to recover his share of fixed 
costs, i.e. (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑥𝑒 ≥ 𝐹.  Otherwise there would be no application. Moreover, assuming 
that the non-GI good is a commodity in perfectly elastic supply, no GI means a surplus of 
zero for all producers and consumers. From a social welfare point of view, the value from 
any GI that producers are willing to implement is therefore positive, regardless of the 
actual size proposed. (As we emphasized, this conclusion is conditional on our 
assumptions and may be different under other assumptions on the benefits of GI and non-
GI production.) 
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Third, since GI areas will only be proposed if producers can recover their fixed costs, 
there exists a range of potential GIs which would have a positive impact on social welfare 
but which are not profitable from the producers’ point of view. Since the initiative to apply 
for a GI lies with the producers, such GIs will not be proposed, and thus not implemented. 
While all proposed GIs are therefore welfare-increasing, not all welfare-increasing GIs 
will be proposed. 
Fourth, the institutional setup of the application process affects the outcome. It is 
interesting to compare what our model predicts would be the political equilibrium under 
an institutional set-up such as that of the American Viticultural Areas (AVAs) compared 
to that of the EU GI scheme. As explained in section 2, once the applicant has started the 
process, the American regulator TBT can unilaterally impose a size on the applicant. In 
theory, a rational TBT will always exercise this option and impose 𝑥𝐺 . In equilibrium, 
only those applicants for whom Π𝐴(𝑥𝐺) ≥ 0 apply for an AVA label, and they 
immediately propose 𝑥𝐺 . While this increases the desirability of proposed GIs from the 
point of view of the government’s objective function, the expectation of lower surplus 
also implies that a wider range of potential GIs will not be proposed.  
Conclusion 
In this article, we developed a theoretical model to study both the socially optimal size of 
a GI area and the political equilibrium. Our analysis started from four key facts about GIs. 
First, a larger GI area means more production and lower prices. Second, a larger area 
allows fixed costs to be spread over more producers. Third, a larger GI area may have a 
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negative effect on (actual or perceived) quality, which reduces consumers’ utility and 
willingness to pay. Fourth, the initiative to establish a GI is taken by producers, who 
engage in bargaining with the government.  
Based on this, we derived the socially optimal GI size 𝑥∗ and the applicant’s optimal 
size 𝑥𝐴. The applicant’s optimum 𝑥𝐴 is smaller than the social optimum 𝑥∗ as long as the 
club-effect and the effect of rent-seeking through quantity are not offset by the effect of 
rent-seeking through quality. The government’s optimal GI size depends on the relative 
lobbying weights of insiders, outsiders and consumers. We modeled the bargaining 
between applicants and the government and showed that the initial proposal of the 
applicant should be such that it is optimal for the government to accept it immediately. 
The more the applicant is patient and the government is not, the closer the outcome is to 
the applicant’s optimum. Importantly, while this secures the applicant economic rents 
above those that are socially optimal, the GI will still improve consumer welfare, as long 
as consumers have the choice of buying the non-GI commodity: any proposed GI will be 
welfare-enhancing. On the other hand, since producers need to cover fixed costs, not all 
welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed.  
Our analysis could be extended in several ways. First, while we have assumed 
symmetric information between producers and the government, producers may have better 
information on supply and demand conditions, which might create more complicated 
bargaining dynamics. Second, changes are often made to existing GIs. A natural question 
is therefore whether current modification rules generate socially desirable changes to GI 
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sizes.32 Third, our model does not distinguish between domestic and foreign consumers 
of the GI product. Adding trade to the model would create the possibility of extracting 
rents from foreign consumers, whose surplus is not counted in the government’s objective 
function; such an extension could shed light on the debate around GIs in international 
trade (Josling, 2006). Finally, our theoretical framework shows that determining a socially 
optimal GI area requires information on how a change in quality would affect infra-
marginal consumers; information on this impact cannot be derived from changes in market 
prices alone. One option is to complement technical assessments, which currently 
dominate the evaluation of GI applications,33 with analyses of effects on consumer utility, 
e.g. through willingness to pay experiments. 
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Tables and figures 
 
EU GI 
application  
Procedural step Duration 
Producer 
proposal 
Informal bargaining with national government Unspecified 
Official submission to national government Unspecified 
National 
procedure 
Admissibility check Unspecified 
National opposition procedure “reasonable period” 
National reconciliation Unspecified 
EU-wide 
procedure 
Admissibility check and official publication Max. 6 months 
Opposition period – notice of opposition 3 months 
Opposition period – reasoned statement Max. 2 months 
Admissibility check of opposition  Max. 2 months 
Consultations and reconciliation Max. 6 months 
Admissibility check of modified documents Max. 6 months 
Final decision by EU Commission Unspecified 
Publication of registration or rejection Unspecified 
Table 1. Summary of GI application procedure in the EU 
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Figure 1. Applicant’s optimal size 𝒙𝑨 versus the social optimum 𝒙∗ 
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Figure 2. The structure of the bargaining game over GI size 
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Figure 3. Bargaining over GI size: equilibrium identification 
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Figure 4. Equilibrium GI size as a function of 𝜹𝑨 
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Figure 5. Equilibrium GI size with different lobby strengths 
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Appendix: discontinuous changes in quality 
Our model assumes a continuous quality function. In reality, the conditions (such as soil 
quality) which create “terroir” may change more abruptly. In the next paragraphs, we 
show that such potential discontinuities do not alter the main mechanisms of the model. 
Assume, for instance, that there is a core region with high intrinsic quality, a 
discontinuous break at a certain point ?̂?, and a surrounding area with much lower quality. 
In this scenario, the quality function 𝜎(𝑖) denoting the quality 𝜎 at distance 𝑖 is no longer 
continuous and decreasing but rather a step function, as shown in Figure 6.34  
The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in the main text. In the bottom 
panel of Figure 6, we derive the social optimum. Since 𝑠𝑥 jumps from zero to a negative 
value at ?̂?, the utility effect −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 has a similar jump. Moreover, the equilibrium price of 
the GI product 𝑝 will also have a kink at ?̂?. If 𝑝 − 𝑐 and −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 intersect to the left or to 
the right of ?̂?, the results are identical to those in the main text. However, it is possible 
that the two curves do not intersect, but that 𝑝 − 𝑐 passes through the discontinuity as 
illustrated. In this case, the social optimum is 𝑥∗ = ?̂? and the border of the socially optimal 
GI region coincides with the natural discontinuity in quality. The larger the gap between 
the quality levels on both sides of ?̂?, the larger the jump in −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 and the more likely it is 
that the social optimum coincides with the discontinuity. Similar analyses can be made 
for the optimum of the applicant, producers and the government. 
  
                                                 
34 Note that even with a discontinuous quality function 𝜎(𝑖) the average quality function s(𝑥) is 
continuous. But 𝑠𝑥, the derivative of average quality with respect to the size will be discontinuous. 
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Figure 6. Discontinuous Changes in Quality 
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